The Weaknesses And Weaknesses Of Phases Iv V And The...

The weaknesses with CDRUSCENTCOM’s OA involved the friction and the lack of the integration of the interagency in the planning of phases IV-V and the initial strategic assumptions that affected CDRUSCENTCOM’s OA. The first weakness was the failure of both CDRUSCENTCOM and interagency organizations to include the NSC, Departments of Defense/State, and the U.S. Agency of International Development to integrate and coordinate their strategic objectives into a comprehensive unified plan in support of OIF. This failure enabled the post regime change of Iraq to set the foundation for the insurgency that would start to grow in 2004. The second weakness was the strategic assumptions of OIF that were never validated before the commencement of†¦show more content†¦However, the strategic, operational, and tactical actions by CENTCOM and the U.S. government agencies did not occur because there was no unified plan for phases IV-V. This assessment included three major events . First, was CDRUSCENTCOM’s failure in his OA to plan for the occupation of Iraq post phase III and into phases IV-V. Second, there were two orders signed by Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority. These two orders included the de-Ba’athification plan of Iraq’s elite sectarian society and the disbanding of all Iraqi Government Departments and Iraqi Military Organizations. Finally, with Bremer creating the Iraqi Governing Council post the disbanding of Iraq’s Government, he set the political and military foundation for the insurgency that would continue for many years. These strategic and operational miscalculations did not support phases IV-V and CENTCOM to include MNF-I did not have enough forces to suppress the insurgency. The reframing and change of strategy for the OIF campaign should have occurred earlier in the campaign especially after phase III. Now the reframing was vital to the U.S. interests if the U.S. and MNF-I wanted to regain its strategic, operational, and tactical initiative in Iraq. Early in 2007, the change of strategy occurred with the surge forces that enabled strategic, operational, and tactical opportunities in Iraq. POTUS’ change in strategic direction in Iraq